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1. INTRODUCTION
Intermediaries play important roles in consumer search. Shopping malls and (multi-
product) retailers, for example, have traditionally served as intermediaries for consumers
who search for products from various manufacturers. As economic activities are increasingly
connected through the Internet, consumers can have access to more products at lower search
costs, but they also face a much larger set of sellers to choose from. Consumers are thus
increasingly dependent on intermediaries to guide their search (in some deliberate order) for
sellers and products. This has led to enormous commercial successes of Internet companies
such as Google, Amazon, and Expedia. How can we understand the strategies and successes
of these search intermediaries? How do they a¤ect consumer search and welfare? What
public policies, if any, can potentially improve performance in these markets? This paper
presents some simple economics that addresses these issues.1
There are di¤erent ways in which search intermediaries operate. For example, an search
engine provides sponsored links to sellers who win keyword auctions. The seller makes a
payment to the search engine when a consumer visits the seller (i.e., clicks the sellers link),
regardless of whether and how much the consumer purchases from the seller. A search
platform (or an online marketplace), on the other hand, may host various sellers. Each
seller could be charged a hosting fee as, for example, a at monthly fee by Yelp SeatMe
to each restaurant for reservations, or a commission as a percentage of the transaction
amount, as, for example, by Expedia. It is also possible that an intermediary has multiple
functions. For example, an online store like Amazon is both a multi-product retailer and a
marketplace for independent sellers: as a retailer it sets prices for its various products, and
as a marketplace it may charge an entry fee or collects fees from each seller depending on
its transaction amount.
We propose an analytical framework with the following key features: A market contains
1While this paper will focus on how intermediaries may a¤ect consumer search, there are other reasons
for consumers to conduct search in a deliberate instead of a random order, as discussed in details in
Armstrong (2106).
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a unit mass of consumers and N  2 sellers: Each consumer, who demands one unit of a
product, is uncertain whether a particular seller o¤ers the product that she desires and how
much she is willing to pay for it. Specically, seller is product (i = 1; 2; :::N) will match
a consumers need with probability i 2 (0; 1], whereas 1   i is the probability that it is
not a match. A consumers valuation of a product from i 2 
 is ui; where 
 is the set of
matched sellers for the consumer, and her valuation of the product from any non-matched
seller is normalized to zero. After i is realized and is known privately by i; an intermediary
provides a mechanism that selects n  N sellers into a platform, together with a search
technology for consumers to search sellers on the platform. Sellers then simultaneously
and independently set their prices, after which each consumer chooses whether and how to
conduct sequential search, on the platform and possibly also o¤ the platform. Each search,
with a search cost, will enable the consumer to discover her valuation for and the price of
the sellers product. All players are risk neutral.
This framework contains as special cases a number of models of search for di¤erentiated
products, with or without an intermediary. One way to classify these models is according
to the following possible relationships between the values of di¤erent matched sellers for
each consumer:
 Perfect Dependence (PD): for each consumer, the values of all her matched sellers are
perfectly dependent they are the same: ui  u for all i 2 
; where u is a random
draw from distribution F () with density f on support [u; u] ; and u > u  0:2 Athey
and Ellison (2011), and Chen and He (2011), among others, consider the PD case
with i < 1.
3
 Independence (ID): for each consumer, each of her matched sellers has an independent
value: ui is an independent draw from distribution F () for every i 2 
: Anderson and
2Note that i is rm-specic, but its realization is consumer-specic (in the sense that a match for one
consumer does not necessarily imply a match for another). Also, both 
 and u are consumer-specic, but
for each consumer, u is equal across her matched sellers.
3Eliaz and Spiegler (2016) also assume PD, and in their model consumers who have limited abilities to
describe their needs can send inquires to an intermediary.
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Renault (1999), Armstrong et al (2009), and Wolinsky (1986), among others, consider
the ID case with i = 1:
Moreover, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) considers the ID case with i < 1; while Chen and
Zhang (2016) considers both the PD and the ID cases with i < 1.
4 The true relationship
is likely neither PD nor ID, but studies in the literature have made these more extreme
assumptions for analytical tractability.5 As we shall discuss below, the PD approach is
analytically more convenient because it makes the derivation of the equilibrium market
price straightforward.6
We will proceed by considering various cases of this framework. Section 2 reviews an
especially simple base model under the assumption of PD, where a search engine auctions a
given number of positions to sellers. In equilibrium, a seller with a higher match quality (i.e.,
a higher i) bids more to be placed at a higher position on the search engines list, because
it has a higher expected prot from being searched by a consumer, whereas consumers will
search the sellers in the order of their placement on the list. The search engine thus serves
as an information intermediary, guiding consumers to search sellers more e¢ ciently. This
results in higher output, consumer surplus, and total welfare.
Section 3 discusses two more sophisticated models, in which there is (additional) incom-
plete information about sellersmatch probabilities, respectively under the assumptions of
PD and ID. These models further illustrate the benecial e¤ects of the search engine on
4Starting from the seminal work of Stigler (1961), the economics of consumer search has advanced in the
directions of search for the best price among homogeneous sellers (e.g., Stahl, 1989) and of search for the
best value among horizontally di¤erentiated sellers (e.g., Wolinsky, 1986 and the other ID models above). In
the more recent PD models mentioned above, rms are vertically di¤erentiated but ex post each consumers
matched sellers are homogeneous.
5Analytical tractability would be a major issue for a search model in which consumersproduct valuations
are dependent in a general form, because in this case a consumers search strategy is non-stationary, as she will
keep updating her belief about product valuations during search. Consumer search strategies are stationary
under both PD and ID, which greatly simplies the analysis.
6Armstrong and Zhou (2011) consider a Hotelling model where a consumers valuations for two products
have perfect negative correlation, and hence the consumer will learn both productsvaluations after searching
only one rm.
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consumers and total welfare, and both models also o¤er additional insights on how the
search engine can optimally design position auctions or set a uniform fee for each position
on its platform.
Section 4 analyzes a model where an intermediary endogenously chooses the size of its
search platform. We nd that when search cost is su¢ ciently low, the intermediary will
charge an entry fee that is too high, or will admit too few sellers to its search platform,
from the perspectives of consumers and total welfare; whereas if search cost is su¢ ciently
high, the intermediarys entry fee is too high for consumer welfare and possibly also for
total welfare. We also nd that the presence of the intermediary will benet consumers
when search cost is above some threshold, but it will now harm consumers when search cost
is su¢ ciently low.
Section 5 discusses several situations where an intermediary may reduce search e¢ ciency
and welfare, including when sellers are di¤erentiated only horizontally, when the intermedi-
ary may have a bias due to its possible (partial) vertical integration, and when it auctions
sponsored positions for sellers of experience goods or credence goods. Section 6 concludes.
2. A BASE MODEL
We start with an illustrative base model in which the intermediary is a search engine that
has n positions on its platform. Sellers can bid payments to the search engine to be placed
at these positions, in the order of their bids. In equilibrium, sellers with higher match
probabilities (i) will bid higher and be placed on the platform at higher positions, whereas
consumers will rst sequentially search the sellers on the platform, in the order of positions,
before searching sellers o¤ the platform. The intermediary thus guides consumers to search
the more relevantsellers who have higher match probabilities, which improves consumer
search e¢ ciency and boosts both consumer and total welfare. The main idea for the model
was developed in Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011) in their analysis of
keyword auctions from companies such as Google in settings with consumer search.7 The
7The auction of advertisement positions by a search engine has been studied by Edelman et al. (2007)
and Varian (2007), among others. Athey-Ellison and Chen-He rst embedded such aunctions in models of
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discussion below follows closely Chen and He (2011).
Specically, a search engine (E) has n < N positions E1; E2; :::; En, each of which can
list a seller. For simplicity, suppose that there are N known values of match probabilities,
but consumers do not know how these values are assigned to the N sellers. In other words,
each sellers match probability is its private information. Let Si; i = 1; 2; :::; denote the
sellers in the descending order of their match probability. For convenience, assume n = 3;
N  4; and the match probability for seller Si is
i =
8<: i 1 for i = 1; 2; 33 for i = 4; : : : ; N ;
where ;  2 (0; 1). Thus the match probability decreases among the sellers at a constant
rate  for 3 sellers and then becomes constant for the rest of the sellers:8 Each consumers
matched sellers have identical value u; which is a random draw from F (u) :
We assume that there exists a unique pm such that
pm = arg max
p
fp [1  F (p)]g ; m = pm [1  F (pm)] : (1)
Then pm is the price of a monopolist selling a product to a population of consumers whose
valuations for the product follow distribution F:
Consumers may have some constant search cost per search initially, but the search cost
becomes higher after some searches, possibly due to time constraints or search fatigue. To
capture such consideration and for convenience, we assume that the cost for each consumer
to conduct her jth search is, for j = 1; : : : ; N :
sj =
8<: s for j = 1; 2; 3; 4sh for j > 4 ; where s < 3
uZ
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du < sh: (2)
consumer search.
8We consider this rather special setting in order to illustrate the main idea most conveniently and trans-
parently. In more general models, i can be random draws from some distriubution, as, for example, in
Athey and Ellison (2011), Elizr and Spiegler (2011), and Chen and Zhang (2016). See discussions in later
sections.
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The search engine auctions the positions to the sellers in a second price auction, where
the seller who bids the most is listed at the highest position (at E1) and pays the second
highest bid, and so on. We proceed to construct the equilibrium where the search engine
guides consumer search through the position auction.
First, suppose that the sellers placed on E are in the order of their relevance, namely
that Si takes the positions of Ei for i = 1; 2; 3. Suppose further that all sellers set their
prices equal to pm. Then, a consumers expected surplus (excluding the search cost) is
i 1
uZ
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du; for i = 1; 2; 3;
from searching Ei and is
3
uZ
pm
(u  pm) f (u) du
from searching any randomly selected seller not listed on E:
Given the presumed placement of sellers on E and the sellerspricing, it is clearly optimal
for each consumer to search sequentially, in the order of E1, E2, E3 and then one randomly
selected seller not listed on E.9 The consumer stops searching when she either nds a match
or has conducted these four searches without nding a match. She will purchase from a
matched seller if u  pm but does not purchase if u < pm.
Next, given consumerssearch and purchase behavior described above, if a sellers product
matches a consumers need, then the sellers price that maximizes his expected prot from
this consumer, without knowing the consumers realized u, is pm, and following Diamond
(1971), pm is the unique equilibrium price with consumer search.
Therefore, given consumerssearch and purchase behavior, if S1, S2, and S3 are placed at
E1, E2, and E3, the expected prots of Si, excluding their payments to the search engine,
9Notice that consumers can optimally choose whether to search on or o¤ the search engines platform,
even though this is modeled in a very coarse way.
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are
1 = 
m; 2 = (1  ) 1; 3 = (1  ) 2; (3)
k =
1  2
N   3 3; for k = 4; : : : ; N: (4)
The analysis of bidding strategies here di¤ers from the usual second price auction, since
there are multiple positions to be auctioned, and the values of E1, E2, E3 and not winning
the bid are endogenous for the bidders, depending on who will be placed at alternative
positions. Because a rm with a higher match probability is more likely to yield a sale
when being searched by a consumer, it has a higher expected prot being placed on E
and being searched earlier. Furthermore, when rms charge the same price in equilibrium,
consumers will want to search the more relevant rms rst, in order to reduce expected
search cost. The competitive bidding for positions thus leads to an equilibrium where more
relevant rms bid more, are placed higher, and are more likely searched by consumers, as
Chen and He (2011) establish in the following:
Proposition 1 Assume   max
n
2  1 ; 1 2 
o
  (). Then, there is an equilibrium in
which seller Si bids to pay the search engine
b1 = 1 +

1  1  
3
N   3

3; b2 = 
21 +

1  1  
2
N   3

3; (5)
b3 =

1  1  
3
N   3

3; bk =

1  1  
2
N   3

3; k = 4; : : : ; N: (6)
S1, S2, S3 are placed at E1, E2, E3 and pay b2, b3; and b4, respectively. Each sellers price
is pm, and each consumer searches sequentially in the order of E1, E2, E3 and then one
randomly selected seller not listed on E. The consumer stops searching either when she
nds a match, in which case she purchases if u  pm; or when she has conducted these four
searches without nding a match.
Notice that at the (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium, consumers search optimally under the
belief that all sellers charge price pm and that the sellers placed at E1; E2; E3 and not on E
respectively have match probabilities 1; 2; 3; and 3; and given the consumerssearch
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strategy, rms bid and price optimally; and consumersbeliefs are consistent with the rms
strategies. We shall focus on this equilibrium, which is quite natural in this context, even
though there are other equilibria in this model.10
The parameter restriction on  in Proposition 1, which is satised if   max12 ; 	 ;
provides a su¢ cient but not necessary condition (when N > 4) for the equilibrium. Intu-
itively, if  is too small relative to , the sellers will become too similar in their relative
relevance, which makes the condition that no seller will mimic the other sellers bidding
strategy di¢ cult to satisfy.
The search engines prot, which is also its revenue since it has no production cost, is
  = b2 + b3 + b4; (7)
which can be shown to increase in N: This is because as more sellers are present in the
market, a seller is less likely to be selected randomly by a buyer o¤ the platform, and thus
placement on the search engines platform is more valuable. This motivates the sellers to
bid more for placement, increasing  .
Also, solving  from limN!1 @ @ = 0; we nd that, as N !1;   is maximized when  is
^ ()  1
62

1 + 2 + 22  
p
4 + 22   43 + 44 + 1

; (8)
which decreases in ; with lim!0 ^ () = 12 and lim!1 ^ () =
5 p7
6 . Thus, when N is
large,   has an inverted-U shape with respect to : it increases in  for  < ^ () but
decreases in  for  > ^ (). Intuitively, an increase in  has a positive e¤ect on the value
of being placed at E1, since consumers are more likely to purchase at E1; but it also has
negative e¤ects on the values of being placed at E2 and on E3; since consumers will be less
likely to visit E2 and E3: The balance of these e¤ects results in the search engines revenue
being rst increasing and then decreasing in .
10One other possible equilibrium is that S1; S2; and S3 will bid some identical amount, higher than the
rest of sellersbids, and be placed on E in random order, while consumers will search the sellers on E in
random order before they possibly search a seller o¤ E; and all sellers again charge pm: The search engine
again guides consumer search, although its improvement on consumer search e¢ ciency is not as high as the
equilibrium in Proposition 1.
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We can also investigate consumer welfare and e¢ ciency properties of the equilibrium. One
way is to see how the paid placement of sellers on the search engine impacts the probability
of nding a match for a consumer for the same search cost. Without paid placement and
for large N , the probability of a match from each search is
1
N

1 +  + 2 + (N   3) 3  3;
whereas with paid placement the probability of a match from each search is respectively
; ; 2 for the rst three searchers and 3 thereafter. Therefore, for the same search
cost, the search engine increases the probability of nding a match.
Another way to evaluate the e¢ ciency property of the equilibrium with the search engine
acting as an information intermediary is to see how it impacts expected output. The
expected output under paid placement is
qh =

1  (1  ) (1  )  1  2  1  3 [1  F (pm)] ; (9)
whereas the expected output without paid placement is approximately
ql =
h
1   1  34i [1  F (pm)] < qh: (10)
We therefore conclude:
Remark 1 Paid placement by the search engine leads to more e¢ cient consumer search
and to higher total output.
The stylized model above abstracts away from other important considerations in the
placement of sellers by a search intermediary. For example, Google determines ad placement
using a quality measure of the sellers (click-through rate) in addition to bids.11 The fact
that the search engine may also consider factors such as the sellersquality of service and/or
prices in determining the sellersplacement is likely to reinforce the main conclusion that
position auction provides useful information to consumers that facilitates consumer search
and improves e¢ ciency. Consideration of these other factors may also support the nding
that the search engines revenue may not be monotonically increasing in sellersrelevance.
11See, for example, Gomes (2014) for an analysis of auction design based on the mechanism-design ap-
proach.
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3. INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND DEPENDENCE RELATIONS
In this section, we discuss a more sophisticated way to model di¤erent sellersmatch
probabilities and an alternative assumption on the dependence relations between a buyers
values of the products from her matched sellers.
3.1 Incomplete Information about Match Probabilities
Recall that in the base model, there are N known values of match probabilities among
the N sellers, even though the specic match probability of each seller is its private infor-
mation. An alternative, possibly more realistic assumption is that there is also incomplete
information about the values of the match probabilities. One way to model this is to assume
that each i is a random draw from some distribution and is only known to seller i: The
problem is then much more complicated, since consumers would need to form expectations
about 1; 2; :::N ; even when they know from the position auction that the sellers with
the highest match probabilities, again denoted as S1; S2; :::; Sn; are placed respectively at
E1; E2; :::; En on E: Furthermore, when a consumer does not nd a match after inspecting
a seller, say S1; she may update her beliefs about the match probabilities of the remaining
sellers.
Athey and Ellison (2011) analyze a model with such incomplete information, and show
also that position auction by the search engine improves consumer search e¢ ciency and
welfare. In their model, when a consumer nds a seller who meets her need, the consumer
and the seller each receives a payo¤ of 1. Consumers have di¤erent search cost, which
follows some distribution on [0; 1] : In the equilibrium they focus on, sellers with higher
match qualities bid more and are placed at higher positions on the search engines list, and
consumers whose search cost is below some critical value will search the sponsored links
according to their orders on the list. The intuition behind this equilibrium is similar to that
in the base model of section 2: A seller with a higher match quality is willing to bid more to
be searched earlier by consumers, because it has a higher expected payo¤ to be searched by
each consumer; and consumers will optimally search the sellers on the sponsored list in the
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order of their positions, because this search strategy has the highest expected net payo¤.
As Athey and Ellison (2011) explain, the list of sponsored links provide consumers with
two types of information. They identify a set of sellers that may meet the consumers need,
and they provide information on relative match quality that helps consumers search through
this set more e¢ ciently. Compared to the situation where there is no list of the sponsored
links, the search engine benets consumers in two ways: some consumers who would not
search without the list will now search, with their expected surplus increasing from zero to
positive; and the consumers who would search without the list can now potentially nd a
match through fewer searches. The higher search e¢ ciency and higher output also increase
total welfare.
In addition to establishing the existence of a symmetric pure strategy perfect Bayesian
equilibrium for the model and characterizing the strictly monotone equilibrium bidding
strategy of rms, Athey and Ellison (2011) also provide interesting insights on auction
design, especially on how to set the reserve price.
3.2 Independent Values of Matched Sellers
Both the base model and the model in subsection 3.1 assume that a consumers values
from all her matched sellers are the same they are perfectly dependent and are ran-
domly drawn from F . One advantage of this assumption is that the determination of the
equilibrium price becomes straightforward it is simply equal to the monopoly price pm;
invariant with search cost following Diamond (1971): This allows us to focus on the search
engines role to guide consumers to nd their desired products, which could be of rst-order
importance for consumers to conduct online keyword search.
An alternative approach is to assume that a consumers value from each of her matched
sellers is independently drawn from F: Then; the equilibrium price will generally depend
on consumer search cost s; which could be more plausible.12 To illustrate, we assume that
12As we shall see shortly, how the equilibrium price may vary with s in this model depends crucially on
the hazard rate of F: In other models of consumer search, prices can be either higher or lower when search
cost is lower (e.g., Chen and Zhang, 2011; and Moraga-Gonzalez, et al., 2016).
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there is a continuum of sellers of measure 1, whose match probability  follows cdf G () ;
and the search engine has a range of spaces  2 (0; 1) ; which can be occupied by rms who
will pay some per-click price r:
As in Eliaz and Spiegler (2011), suppose all rms whose  is above some threshold t
(  t) will pay r to be listed on the search platform, E; and charge price p:13 Consider a
consumers search strategy on E: Because all rms charge p, consumers face a stationary
problem, and searches optimally with reservation value u: Denote the expected match
quality of sellers on E by
 =
R 1
t dG ()
1 G (t) : (11)
Then, when s is small enough, there is a unique u that solves

Z u
u
(u  u) dF (u) = s; (12)
where the LHS is the incremental expected benet from one more search on E; while the
RHS is the cost per additional search. Notice that u is higher when s is lower: the consumer
will have a higher reservation value when search is less costly.
Next consider the pricing decision of rms on E: If a rm deviates from the equilibrium
price p to another price p, a consumer who visits the rm and learns that the product is
a match with value u > 0 will buy the rms product if
u  p > u   p;
because the RHS of this inequality represents the consumers reservation surplus conditional
on a match. Thus, the probability that the consumer will buy at p is 1  F (u + p  p) :
Therefore, the rm will choose p to maximize
p [1  F (u + p  p)] :
Setting p = p in the rst-order condition, we have
p =
1  F (u)
f (u)
: (13)
13We thus consider a uniform price equilibrium. Hence, the model does not capture a salint feature of
many consumer markets: the prevalence of price dispersion, which has been studied in a di¤erent type of
models (e.g., Varian, 1980; Stahl, 1989; Baye and Morgan, 2001).
12
The expected surplus for each consumer is u   p; which is positive when s is small. Also,
a lower s leads to a higher u and thus also to a lower p; provided that F has an increasing
hazard rate, which we shall assume in this subsection. Notice that while it is intuitive
that equilibrium price will be lower under a lower search cost, (13) also indicates that price
is constant (or higher) when search cost is lower if the hazard rate of F is constant (or
decreasing).14 The expected prot per click for the marginal rm type, t; is
t = tp
 [1  F (u)] = t [1  F (u
)]2
f (u)
:
By the same logic, the equilibrium price for the rms not on the search platform will be
p =
1  F (u)
f (u)
;
where u < u solves
L
Z u
u
(u  u) dF (u) = s; with L =
R t
0 dG ()
G (t)
< t < :
Therefore, under the assumption that the hazard rate of F is increasing, p > p and all
consumers will only search on the platform provided by the search engine, which means that
the rms not on the platform will earn zero prot. To ll exactly the  listing positions,
we need G (t) = 1   ; so that every rm with   t will pay for a position and the mass
of rms on the list will be 1 G (t) = : Firms will then bid r up to
r = G 1(1 ) = G 1 (1  )
[1  F (u)]2
f (u)
;
the marginal sellers prot per consumer visit, so that the marginal type will have zero net
prot (after paying the fee to the search engine), the same as any rm o¤ the list, while all
other rms on the platform will earn positive expected prot.
Notice that if no search engine is present, the expected match quality in the market is
lower than ; which means that in equilibrium consumers will have a lower reservation value
14 Interestingly, the price e¤ect of market structure under horizontal di¤erentiation depends similarly on
the hazard rate of the corrosponding (marginal) distribution F : competition leads to a lower, the same,
or a higher price compared to monopoly when the hazard rate of F is respectively increasing, constant, or
decresing (Chen and Riordan, 2008; and, for general preference dependence, Chen and Riordan, 2015).
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than u and rms will charge a higher price than p: Therefore, consumer surplus, which is
equal to reservation value minus price, is higher due to the search engine. Moreover, total
welfare is also higher in the presence of the search engine, because with a continuum of
rms all consumers eventually purchase, but with the guide of the search engine consumers
will be able to search rms that have higher match probabilities and thus search more
e¢ ciently. Same as in our base model, here the search engine is benecial to consumers
and total welfare because it serves as a useful information intermediary. Sellers with higher
match qualities are willing to pay more to be listed on the search platform, because their
expected prot from the visit by a consumer is higher. The competitive bidding for the
positions on the platform thus selects rms with higher match qualities. As in the base
model, consumer search on the platform is more e¢ cient due to the higher expected match
quality; but now consumers also benet from the intermediary through another channel:
the higher match quality on the search platform intensies price competition, lowering the
equilibrium market price.15
4. PLATFORM SIZE: PRIVATE VS. SOCIAL INCENTIVES
In our discussions so far, the intermediary is assumed to have a given number of positions
on its platform, and its problem is how to assign these positions to sellers. In this section,
we assume that there is no constraint on the size of the platform, but the intermediary
can control the number of sellers who enter the platform by charging an entry fee. We are
interested in two questions in this context. First, how does the equilibrium number of sellers
who enter the platform under the prot-maximizing entry fee compare to the number of
sellers that maximizes consumer welfare or total welfare? Second, will the intermediary be
benecial for consumer search, even if its prot maximizing entry fee possibly induces too
many or too few entrants to the platform?
Suppose that the setting is similar to the base model, but now i is a random draw
15Recall that when the values of the matched sellers are perfectly dependent, the equilibrium price will be
pm; the monopoly price, independent of the expected match quality.
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from cumulative distribution function G and that potential sellers, i = 1; 2; :::; N; can reach
consumers only through the platform set up by the intermediary, who charges an entry fee
(or listing fee) k for each entrant.
The timing is as follows: First, The intermediary commits to a fee k; and i is realized
and privately learned by potential entrants i = 1; 2; :::; N: Next, potential entrants; based
on their private i; simultaneously and independently choose whether to pay the fee to be
listed on the platform: The number of sellers on the platform is then known publicly and is
denoted as n  0. The sellers then simultaneously and independently set prices which will
all be equal to pm because, under the assumption of the base model, for each consumer
the product values of her matched sellers are identical. Finally, each consumer can choose
sequential search to discover whether any particular seller is a match, her u from the match;
and the sellers price. Each search costs s; and at least one search is needed for purchase.
We consider symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this dynamic game of incomplete
information. From Proposition 1 in Chen and Zhang (2016), for any given fee k 2 [0; m] ;
there is a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, with a unique threshold t of
match probability, such that i will pay k to enter i¤ her i  t. Denote the equilibrium
expected number of entrants by E [njk] : It can be shown that
E [njk (t)] = N [1 G (t)] :
The intermediary chooses k to maximize its prot
  = kE [njk] :
In equilibrium, t is an increasing function of k (i.e., the marginal entrant has a higher match
probability when the entry cost is higher): Hence, we can write k  k (t) in equilibrium and
view the intermediarys problem as equivalently choosing t to maximize  :
The marginal entrant, whose i = t; will earn zero net expected prot, so that
E (jt) = k:
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Following Chen and Zhang (2016), we can show
E (jt) = t

m
(
1 M (t)N
N [1 G (t)]
)
;
where m is dened in (1), and
M (t) = 1   [1 G (t)]    (t) =
R 1
t xg (x) dx
1 G (t) :
Notice that M (t) indicates the probability that a potential entrant will not be a match
when the entry threshold is t; while  is the expected quality (match probability) of sellers
who enter. It follows that in equilibrium:
k (t) =
t

m
(
1 M (t)N
N [1 G (t)]
)
;
and hence
  =
h
1 M (t)N
i t

m: (14)
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium associated with a given k 2 [0; m] and a given s; there is a
match probability threshold t such that i will enter i¤ i  t. The intermediarys prot and
the total prot of all sellers are respectively
  =
h
1 M (t)N
i t

m;  =
h
1 M (t)N
i
1  t


m; (15)
consumer welfare, measured by aggregate consumer surplus, and total welfare are respectively
V =
h
1 M (t)N
i
  s


; W =
h
1 M (t)N
i
  s

+ m

; (16)
where  =
R u
pm (u  pm) f (u) du: Moreover, both V and W are single-peaked functions of t;
and, hence, also of k:
Proof. See the appendix.
Dene the entry fees that maximize intermediarys prot, consumer welfare, and total
welfare respectively by
kf = arg max
k
 ; kV = arg max
k
V and kW = arg max
k
W; (17)
with kf = k (tf ) ; kV = k (tV ) ; and kW = k (tW ) : Notice that kV and kW are unique from
Lemma 1, and we assume kf is unique as well:
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Lemma 2 There exists s^ > 0 such that kV S kf if s S s^:
Proof. See the appendix.
Therefore, when s is below s^; the intermediary will charge an entry fee that is too high,
or admits too few sellers to the platform, from the perspective of consumer welfare; while
when s is above s^; the intermediary will admit too many sellers than consumers would like:
Next, we consider total welfare. Notice that
dW
dt
=
dV
dt
+
d
h
1 M (t)N
i
dt
m <
dV
dt
: (18)
Dening the elasticity of  with respect to t as
 (t)  t

d
dt
;
we have:
Lemma 3 kW < kV ; and there exists ~s > s^ such that kW < kf if s < ~s or  (tf ) < 
m
+m ;
but kf < kW if s > ~s and  (tf ) > 
m
+m :
Proof. See the appendix.
Summarizing the analysis above, we have:
Proposition 2 There exist ~s and s^; with ~s > s^ > 0; such that: (i) if s < s^; then the
intermediary will set an entry fee that is too high from the perspectives of consumer welfare
and total welfare (kW < kV < kf ); (ii) if s^ < s < ~s; then the fee is too high for total welfare
but too low for consumer welfare (kW < kf < kV ); and (iii) if s > ~s; then the fee is too low
for both consumer and total welfare (kf < kW < kV ) when  (tf ) > 
0
+0
but too low only
for consumer welfare (kW < kf < kV ) when  (tf ) < 
o
+o :
Notice that 
o
+o depends only on F (u) and  (t) =
t

d
dt depends only on G () : In-
terestingly, the monopoly intermediarys entry fee can be either too high or too low for
consumer welfare and/or for total welfare, depending on the search cost. An entry fee to
the search platform has both a variety e¤ect and a quality e¤ect on consumer search. It
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raises t; so that fewer potential sellers will participate in the platform, which reduces the
variety of goods that consumers can search. On the other hand, a higher t increases the
average quality (match probability) of sellers in the market, which means that consumer
search will be more e¢ cient.16 When search cost is su¢ ciently low (s < s^); the variety
benet to consumers from more entry dominates, but the intermediary does not internalize
such consumer benets. Consequently, its entry fee is too high for consumers and for total
welfare. When search cost is in the intermediate range (s^ < s < ~s); the quality e¤ect
becomes more important, and the intermediary sets an entry that introduces too many
sellers from the perspective of consumer welfare, but still too high for total welfare because
the total prot of sellers is not maximized. When search cost is high enough (s > ~s); the
entry fee may be too low for both consumer and total welfare due to the excessive number
of sellers in the market, and this result depends on how the average seller quality in the
market changes as additional sellers enter.
Although the intermediarys choice of the entry fee generally di¤ers from what would
maximize consumer welfare, the presence of the intermediary can nevertheless benet con-
sumers. Suppose that without the intermediary, consumers can sequentially search all the
N potential sellers, with each search still costing s: Consumer welfare in this case is the
same as V with the intermediary who sets k = 0: Since V is single-peaked from Lemma 1,
proposition 2 then implies that the intermediary increases V if s  s^ and can also increase
V when s is not too much lower than s^: However, as s ! 0; V is maximized when k ! 0;
but kf > 0 is bounded away from 0, and hence the intermediary reduces consumer welfare.
We thus have:
Corollary 1 Under the assumption of this section, the intermediary benets consumers
when search cost is above some threshold, but harms consumers when search cost is su¢ -
ciently low.
A parallel, but more complicated analysis can be carried out under the assumption that
each consumers valuation for any of her matched sellers is an independent draw from cdf
16See Chen and Zhang (2016) for a related discussion.
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F for i = 1; :::; N: The model is then one of both vertical and horizontal di¤erentiation,
where each seller di¤ers in their match quality while each consumers matched sellers also
di¤er horizontally: The equilibrium price when the market has n > 1 sellers (entrants) then
has a complex expression is no longer pm and it is no longer clear that V and W will be
single-peaked functions of k: Part of the complication is that with a higher k, there will be
fewer sellers in the market (a lower n); which tends to raise equilibrium price; but a higher
k also raises the match quality of the marginal entrant and the average seller in the market,
which exerts downward price pressures. The price and welfare e¤ects of a marginal increase
in k are thus more subtle in this setting, but the qualitative result of this section still holds,
with the intermediary still being able to benet consumers when s is relatively large but to
reduce consumer welfare when s is small.17
So far in this section, we have focused on the intermediarys role to change the num-
ber of sellers in the marketplace, which a¤ects search e¢ ciency through the extensive
margin. There are other ways an intermediary can a¤ect consumer search by organizing a
marketplace. For example, by gathering sellers at a common physical location (such as in
a shopping mall) or hosting them on a single website (such as an online shopping center),
the intermediary may reduce the consumer search cost on the marketplace, say from s to
s0, which would enhance the benecial impact of the intermediary. Also, the intermediary
can list the sellers who enter the marketplace in the order of their match quality (instead
of randomly), perhaps through paid advertising or from consumer search data, which could
further provide useful information for consumer search. However, di¤erent from such prac-
tices that can enhance search e¢ ciency, the intermediary may also charge a commission for
each transaction, which can potentially raise sellersmarginal costs and hence their prices.
17See Chen and Zhang (2016) for a detailed analysis of the case where matched sellers are ex post hori-
zontally di¤erentiated. Then, as explained there, when the match qualities of sellers are higher, consumers
have higher incentives to search, which leads to lower prices in equilibrium.
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5. WHEN INTERMEDIARIES MAY NEGATIVELY IMPACT SEARCH
In earlier discussions, we have identied several ways in which an intermediary can facili-
tate consumer search, improving both consumer and total welfare. This section will consider
situations where an intermediary may negatively impact consumer search.
5.1 Firms Are Di¤erentiated only Horizontally
A search intermediary can reduce search e¢ ciency and consumer welfare. This may
happen, for instance, when rms are only horizontally di¤erentiated and the intermediary
directs the order in which consumers search. To illustrate, consider another case of our
general framework, where i =  = 1 for all i; so that every sellers product will meet each
consumers need, but each consumers value for any sellers product is independently drawn
from F: Then, this is the setting of the Wolinsky model (Wolinsky, 1986).18
Now suppose that the intermediary can auction a position to make a seller prominent,
which all consumers will search rst before they randomly and sequentially search other
sellers. As shown in Armstrong et al (2009), the demand for the prominent seller will
become more elastic because all the consumers inspecting its product have not yet visited
other sellers than demand for any other seller and than demand if no seller is made
prominent so that they are all searched in random order. Consequently, in equilibrium the
prominent seller will set a price lower than that charged by the other sellers (and also lower
than the price if every seller is searched randomly), and earn a higher prot than any other
seller because its higher demand; while each consumer is optimal to search the prominent
rm rst given that all other consumers will search the rm rst. The intermediary is thus
able to extract a fee from the rm being placed at the prominent position, as high as the
di¤erence between the prominent rms prot and the prot of any other rm.19 However,
18Search models with horizontally d¤erentiated sellers following Wolinsky (1986) include, for example,
Anderson and Renault (1999), Bar-Isaac et al. (2012), Haan and Moraga-González (2011), and Zhou (2011).
19Rhodes (2011) shows that a prominent rm earns signicantly more prot than other sellers even when
consumerscost of searching and comparing products is essentially zero.
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the prices of the non-prominent rms will be higher than those when no rm is made
prominent, because their demands become less elastic.
On balance, the prominence created by the intermediary guides consumers to search
the low-priced rm rst, but it nevertheless can harm consumers and reduce total welfare,
because the product each consumer purchases on average has lower value than when search
is random. It may not be entirely surprising that ordered search in this case leads to lower
consumer surplus and total welfare than random search, because rms are ex ante symmetric
with purely horizontal di¤erentiation. The intermediary is able to coordinate consumers
search order, but does not provide useful product information as in the earlier models, or
leads to economies in production as, for example, in Bagwell and Ramey (1994).
5.2 Search Engine Bias
In the simple models we have discussed, a search engine generally has no incentive to direct
consumers to products with lower match quality or with higher prices: as an information
intermediary it is unbiased. However, there are situations where the search engine may
have a conicting interest that causes it to be biased. One possibility is that, in addition
to the product information from sellers who display paid ads, consumers also rely on the
search engine to display organic results, information about products from rms who do
not pay to advertise. The relevance of the organic results is important for a search engines
reputation and helps it to attract consumers to its platform. But when the reliability of the
organic results becomes higher, sellers with highly relevant products may choose to depend
more on displays of organic results, lowering their incentives to bid for placement at paid
positions. The desire to increase its revenue from paid placement could then distort the
search engines incentive to improve the search e¢ ciency for the organic results (see, e.g.,
White, 2013).
Bias of the search engine may also arise when it is (partially) vertically integrated, for
instance, by having its own (or a¢ liated) shopping services or content providers (see, e.g.,
Burguet, et al., 2015; de Cornière and Taylor, 2014). Google, for example, has its own
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shopping site Google Shopping and content providers such as Google Finance. Vertical
integration can encourage the intermediary to improve search reliability by internalizing its
benets, but may also motivate the intermediary to divert consumersorganic search towards
its a¢ liates, biased against una¢ liated sites. This may not only lead to ine¢ ciency in
consumer search, but also potentially harm competition in the providersmarket. However,
as Burguet, et al. (2015) points out, if the intermediary already has a bias towards sponsored
searches, then some integration could alleviate the distortion between sponsored and organic
results.
While the search engine may have a bias in directing consumer search, consumer search
e¢ ciency can still be higher with the search engine than without it. Moreover, reputation
concerns, (potential) competition from alternative search intermediaries, and antitrust en-
forcement can provide countervailing incentives and forces to alleviate the search engines
bias in displaying search results.
5.3 Experience or Credence Goods
A key assumption in the literature on search and search intermediaries is that the goods
concerned are inspection goods: a consumer can determine whether a product meets her
need after an inspection, and there can be no quality variations for any product that appears
the same from the inspection. However, in many real-worldsituations, it is possible that
the quality of a good is learned only after consumption (i.e., the case of an experience good)
or is not known even after the consumption (i.e., the case of a credence good). It is also
possible that a seller may provide false product information.
Suppose, for instance, consumers searching for an experience good will purchase if the
product matches their needs from its description. Suppose further that the matched prod-
ucts now di¤er vertically, with a high-quality product having a high (marginal) cost. A
low-quality producer would then be willing to bid more to be placed at top positions
because it has higher prot margins and describes its product as being of high quality. If
consumers are sophisticated, they may not want to purchase from the advertising sellers
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based on their claims, and it would then not be protable for the low-quality sellers to
bid more for the high positions. However, some consumers might be naive and would rst
search the advertised positions and make purchase decisions based on product descriptions,
in which case the low-quality sellers would advertise to exploit the naive consumers.
The intermediary can alleviate this problem by directing consumers to search relevant
sellers, not necessarily those who are willing to pay more, where relevancemay include
broad information about a sellers quality and reputation. It may also choose to remove
certain ads or search results.20 However, an intermediary may be tempted to accept the
high payments from advertisers to boost short-term prot, without exerting enough e¤orts
to screen and keep out the low-quality sellers. It would be important to understand the role
of intermediaries and the functioning of search markets in such environments, a goal that
is being pursued in our on-going research.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper has proposed an analytical framework, where a consumer may incur a search
cost to discover whether a rms product matches her need and her valuation for a matched
product, to discuss how an intermediary may a¤ect consumer search. When rms are
vertically di¤erentiated in their quality, in the sense that they di¤er in the probability
of matching each consumers need, an intermediary can direct consumers to search higher-
quality rms by selling the ad positions on its platform through competitive bidding, thereby
improving search e¢ ciency. The intermediary can also be benecial to consumers and total
welfare when the number of ad positions on its platform is endogenous, even though in this
case it will generally place either too many or too few sellers on its platform, compared
to what would maximize consumer or total welfare. While intermediaries such as search
engines and online marketplaces have facilitated consumer search and enjoyed enormous
20According to MSE news, in May 2016 Google announced that it would ban payday loan ads to protect
consumers from harmful nancial products. It was further reported that Google disabled more than 780
million ads in 2015 for reasons ranging from counterfeiting to phishing (trying to take sensitive information
from people by pretending to be a trustworthy source).
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commercial successes, we also identify several situations where they can reduce the e¢ ciency
of consumer search, namely when rms are di¤erentiated only horizontally,21 when a search
intermediary is (partially) vertically integrated, or when rms sell experience or credence
goods. Markets and policy design in such situations are important topics for future research.
There are other interesting topics for future research, such as how a search intermediary
may contract with sellers, and competition among search intermediaries.
APPENDIX
The appendix contains proofs for Lemmas 1-3.
Proof of Lemma 1. Notice that
h
1 M (t)N
i
is the probability that at least one potential
entrant will be a match for a consumer under entry threshold t; and m is the expected
industry prot when that happens. Given that there is a unit mass of consumers, it follows
that the expected industry prot is
h
1 M (t)N
i
m: The rest of the lemma then follows
immediately from (14) and from Lemma 3 and Theorem 1 of Chen and Zhang (2016):
Proof of Lemma 2. It su¢ ces to show that tV S tf if s S s^:
At t = tf ; we have
d 
dt
jt=tf =
d
h
1 M (t)N
i
dt
t

m +
h
1 M (t)N
i d t
dt
m = 0;
or
d
h
1 M (t)N
i
dt
=  
h
1 M (t)N
i d t =dt
t=
:
21For example, the match probability of each rm for every consumer is equal to 1, and each consumers
valuation for any matched product is an independent random draw from some known distribution.
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Then:
dV
dt
jt=tf =
d
h
1 M (t)N
i
dt

  s


+
h
1 M (t)N
i s
2
d
dt
=  
h
1 M (t)N
i d t =dt
t=

  s


+
h
1 M (t)N
i s
2
d
dt
=
h
1 M (t)N
i24 d

t


=dt
t=
 +
0@2d

t


=dt
t
+
d
dt
1A s
2
35
=
h
1 M (t)N
i24 d

t


=dt
t=
 +
s
t
35 ;
where the last equality holds because, from Lemma 1 of Chen and Zhang (2016),
(i)
d
dt
=
g (t)
1 G (t) (   t) > 0; (ii)
d

t


dt
=
   g(t)t( t)1 G(t)
2
> 0;
and thus
2
t
d

t


dt
=
1
t

   g (t) t (   t)
1 G (t)

=

t
  d
dt
:
Notice that if s ! 0; we have dVdt jt=tf < 0. Furthermore, for a given t; search cost is
smaller than the expected search benet: s < : When s! ;
 
d

t


=dt
t=
 +
s
t
=  1



t
  d
dt

 +
1
t
 =
1

d
dt
 > 0
and thus dVdt jt=tf > 0. Moreover, it can be veried that dVdt increases in s: Therefore, there
exists a unique s^ such that tV S tf if s S s^
Proof of Lemma 3. From (18), tW < tV ; and hence kW < kV :
Moreover, if s < s^; kV < kf and thus kW < kf :
Next consider the case s > s^: Similar to the analysis of deriving dVdt ; we can show (replacing
 with  + m)
dW
dt
jt=tf =
h
1 M (t)N
i24 d

t


=dt
t=
( + m) +
s
t
35 :
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If s! s^; dWdt jt=tf < dVdt jt=tf = 0: If s! ,
 
d

t


=dt
t=
 
 + 0

+
s
t
=  1



t
  d
dt

m +
1

d
dt

=  1
t
m +
1

d
dt
( + m) ;
which is positive (negative) if
 (t) =
t

d
dt
> (<)
m
 + m
:
Therefore, if  (tf ) < 
m
+m ;
dW
dt
jt=tf < 0 (i.e., tW < tf ; or kW < kf ),
and if  (tf ) > 
m
+m , there exists ~s > s^ such that
dW
dt
jt=tf ? 0 (i.e., tW ? tf ; or kW ? kf ) if s ? ~s:
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